Temperature Check — Conditional Treasury ANON Support Below $1 (Revised, Pilot-Based)

Context
My previous RFC (RFC-4) did not get enough visible community engagement to progress. That’s on me — the proposal was detailed, but it didn’t create an easy on-ramp for token holders to react, improve, and rally around it.
This thread is a temperature check + simplified revised proposal to gather feedback and explicit support before any formal HIP/Snapshot stage.


1) What this is / isn’t

This is NOT a price guarantee.
This is NOT an unlimited buyback promise.
This is a rule-based risk-management framework designed to reduce the probability of a “death spiral” only if incentives are aligned and the treasury is not used as exit liquidity for insiders.

If insiders sell while the DAO buys, the program must not run. Simple.


2) Proposed structure: pilot first (limited scope)

Instead of “approve forever,” I propose a time-boxed pilot with strict caps and automatic termination.

Pilot duration: 30 days max
Pilot budget: 10–15% of USDC treasury, hard cap $200,000
Monthly cap: $50,000 OR 20% of 30D avg volume (whichever is lower)
Lifetime cap: $200,000 total (any extension requires new vote)

Goal: test whether the framework reduces downside reflexivity without draining treasury.


3) Activation conditions (all must be true)

Intervention can start ONLY if:

  1. ANON < $1 for 72 consecutive hours

  2. Treasury > $500,000 remains after allocated budget is reserved

  3. Team/foundation wallets are NOT net sellers in last 7 days

  4. No OTC below $1 executed by insiders during the same period

If any condition breaks → auto-pause.


4) Execution rules (no discretionary trading)

Fully rule-based execution (to avoid “subjective trading”):

  • Method: TWAP + tiered limit orders

  • Max per operation: ≤5% daily volume

  • Frequency: every 6 hours while conditions persist

  • Allocation mix: 60% liquidity provisioning / 40% buy walls

  • Public reporting: every operation posted to governance channel + on-chain links


5) Manipulation / abuse safeguards

  • Randomized execution windows (within predefined bands)

  • Volume cap: ≤20% of 24h volume

  • Auto-pause on abnormal sell pressure / suspected coordination

  • Immediate suspension if insider wallets become net sellers


6) What happens if it fails (explicit end-state)

If allocated USDC is depleted and ANON remains < $1:

  • Program terminates automatically

  • DAO review within 7 days with options:

    • tokenomics adjustment

    • revenue-sharing / buyback-from-revenue model

    • controlled wind-down plan (if necessary)

No infinite commitments.


7) What I’m asking from the community (to avoid “no traction” again)

If you want this to advance, please reply with one of the following:

A) Support — “Support moving to HIP draft”
B) Support with changes — specify 1–2 concrete edits (caps/conditions/mechanics)
C) Not support — explain the main blocker (1–2 lines)

If this thread gets at least 10+ distinct holders engaging (support or constructive edits), I’ll convert it into a formal HIP draft with clean language and precise implementation details.


8) Direct questions to the team / foundation

To make incentives aligned, please confirm:

  1. Will the team commit to net-zero selling during intervention?

  2. Will treasury + team holdings be transparently disclosed (at least weekly during pilot)?

  3. Will OTC below $1 by insiders be prohibited during intervention?

Without these, the DAO can’t rationally approve any “support” mechanism.


Closing
The community is not asking the treasury to defend a price at any cost.
We’re asking for aligned incentives + shared responsibility and a bounded, testable pilot.

Post approved, even though it’s not written in RFC format.

Please edit the post and format it with proper title and structure as per template to keep consistency.

Dear Proposer,

Thank you for taking the time to revise your previous RFC and for presenting another framework. We acknowledge the effort to simplify the proposal, introduce strict caps, and explicitly request measurable community engagement before moving toward a HIP.

However, despite the structure and direct call for feedback, this thread has again not generated meaningful participation or explicit support from community members. As stated in the HeyAnon DAO Governance Framework, governance progression requires visible engagement and demonstrated community alignment. At this time, that threshold has not been met.

HeyAnon DAO governance is community-driven. Pproposals cannot advance without stakeholders actively voicing support, constructive edits, or reasoned objections. The absence of engagement signals that the topic currently lacks sufficient traction to proceed further.

Should broader, independent community demand emerge in the future - evidenced by active discussion and holder participation - the topic may be revisited through the standard governance workflow.

Kind regards,
HeyAnon DAO Moderation Team